A Conversation with the Honorable Rosalie Silberman Abella and Dean Matthew Diller by Abella, Rosalie Silberman & Diller, Matthew
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 87 Issue 3 Article 1 
2018 
A Conversation with the Honorable Rosalie Silberman Abella and 
Dean Matthew Diller 
Rosalie Silberman Abella 
Supreme Court of Canada 
Matthew Diller 
Fordham University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Courts Commons, Human Rights Law Commons, International Law Commons, and the 
Judges Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Rosalie Silberman Abella and Matthew Diller, A Conversation with the Honorable Rosalie Silberman Abella 
and Dean Matthew Diller, 87 Fordham L. Rev. 843 (2018). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol87/iss3/1 
This Lecture is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
 843 
THE ROBERT L. LEVINE 
DISTINGUISHED LECTURE 
A CONVERSATION WITH THE 
HONORABLE ROSALIE SILBERMAN ABELLA 
AND DEAN MATTHEW DILLER* 
 
DEAN MATTHEW DILLER:  I want to welcome all of you to the Robert 
L. Levine Distinguished Lecture for this year, and I want to give a special 
thanks to the Levine family for making this lecture and the whole series 
possible.  Fordham Law has been able to host really fantastic guests through 
this series, including last year Justice Ginsburg, Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor, the late Chief Judge Judith Kaye, Judge Robert Katzmann, and 
Judge Raymond Lohier. 
I also want to thank the staff of the Fordham Law Review and in particular 
Amanda Gottlieb for helping to organize this event.  It is always expertly 
done when the Law Review is involved, and I appreciate that. 
This year we are leading up to our celebration of 100 Years of Women at 
Fordham Law School.  In September 1918, the Fordham Law faculty voted 
to admit women,1 and we are planning to celebrate that in style. 
But tonight perhaps is a bit of a teaser for that. 
Justice Rosalie Silberman Abella is a woman of firsts.  She is the first 
Jewish woman to sit on the bench of the Supreme Court of Canada, and 
before the Supreme Court, when she was appointed to the Ontario Family 
Court in 1976, she became the first Jewish woman judge in Canadian history.  
At that time, she was also the country’s second youngest judge—and I will 
just say, younger than thirty. 
Did I mention that she was also at that point carrying her second son, 
Zachary, making her Canada’s first pregnant judge as well? 
Zachary, by the way, as did his brother Jacob, grew up to be a lawyer, as 
lawyers will, and carry on the tradition. 
In 1983, Justice Abella was appointed to head the Royal Commission on 
Equality in Employment, which was established to address the issues of 
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 1. See generally 100 Years of Women, FORDHAM U. SCH. L., https://www.fordham.edu/ 
info/25038/events/10431/100_years_of_women/1 [https://perma.cc/Y5LM-UK35] (last 
visited Nov. 15, 2018). 
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disadvantage in the workplace for women, native people, the disabled, and 
other vulnerable communities.  As the sole Commissioner—that is a great 
Commission—Justice Abella authored the Equality in Employment report,2 
in which she coined the term “employment equity” and thoughtfully laid out 
strategies for protecting minority rights on the job.  Her concepts were 
adopted not only by the Supreme Court of Canada, but also by the 
governments of New Zealand, Northern Ireland, and South Africa. 
Justice Abella has been awarded thirty-eight honorary degrees and was the 
first sitting judge elected to be a fellow of the Royal Society of Canada, an 
organization consisting of Canada’s leading scholars. 
She was also the first incumbent of the James R. Bullock Visiting Chair in 
Canadian Studies at the Hebrew University and was the first woman to 
receive the Distinguished Alumnus Award from the University of Toronto 
Faculty of Law.  I could keep going on with the list of awards. 
She served as a judge of the Giller Literary Prize, Canada’s most 
prestigious literary award.  In 2003, she was awarded the International Justice 
Prize of the Peter Gruber Foundation and, the following year, the Walter 
Tarnopolsky Award for Human Rights by the Canadian Bar Association and 
the International Commission of Jurists.  Just two years ago, the 
Northwestern School of Law honored Justice Abella as its Global Jurist of 
the Year. 
This gives you a sense of the accolades, awards, and accomplishments that 
Justice Abella has both done and received over the course of her career.  Her 
career has been distinguished by an unflagging commitment to human rights, 
equality, and justice. 
Last year, in a commencement address she delivered at Brandeis 
University, she issued a wake-up call for the graduates, and I am going to 
quote a bit from this because I find it so striking: 
[Y]ou see before you a Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada who is 
deeply worried about the state of justice in the world. . . .  [H]ere we are in 
2017 . . . watching “Never Again” turn into “Again and Again,” and 
watching that wonderful democratic consensus fragment, shattered by 
narcissistic populism, an unhealthy tolerance for intolerance, a cavalier 
indifference to equality, a deliberate amnesia about the instruments and 
values of democracy . . . , and a shocking disrespect for the borders between 
power and its independent adjudicators like the press and the courts.3 
Justice Abella feels a great sense of duty in combatting these 
encroachments to democracy and has dedicated time to educating others 
about the responsibilities of members of a free society.  She is the coauthor 
of four books and over seventy-five articles. 
                                                 
 2. Judge Rosalie Silberman Abella, General Summary from “Equality in Employment:  
A Royal Commission Report,” 6 CANADIAN WOMAN STUD. 6 (1985). 
 3. Justice Rosalie Silberman Abella, Supreme Court of Can., Keynote Address at 
Brandeis University Commencement (May 21, 2017), http://www.brandeis.edu/ 
commencement/2017/abella.html [https://perma.cc/QWR3-56VL]. 
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I am going to stop here, because I could go on, and just say that we are so 
thrilled and delighted to have you with us here this evening and eager to hear 
from you.  So I am going to stop talking at this point and ask you a question 
or two. 
JUSTICE ROSALIE SILBERMAN ABELLA:  Thank you.  That was 
really generous.  I appreciate it. 
DEAN DILLER:  I think I will get right into it and start with your 
commencement address at Brandeis.  Can you tell us what you are so 
concerned about in terms of the fate of liberal democracies in the world?  Is 
this a critical moment? 
JUSTICE ABELLA:  Can I say something first? 
DEAN DILLER:  Sure. 
JUSTICE ABELLA:  This is among the firsts I can now add to:  first time 
ever at Fordham Law School.  I have been a fan of your dean for a long time 
and an admirer of the law school, and I am so grateful for the chance to be 
able to come here, so thank you Levine family and Law Review for giving 
me this opportunity.  It is really an honor to be able to be here with you. 
DEAN DILLER:  Thank you.  Let’s get right into it and talk about the 
threat to liberal democracies on a global scale. 
JUSTICE ABELLA:  When I wrote that speech at Brandeis last May, we 
had just come home from having an exchange with the German 
Constitutional Court.  Three of the judges from the Supreme Court of Canada 
met with their Constitutional Court.  That same month, I had meetings with 
the Italian Constitutional Court, and I was on a panel in Italy with female 
judges from around the world. 
It was so striking to me how preoccupied all of the judges were with what 
was happening in Europe.  They were aware of what was going on in North 
America, about which there is very little that I can say, but they were 
particularly worried about what was happening in Hungary; they were 
worried about Turkey; and they were worried about Poland. 
Their concern, as people who are enforcers of the rule of law—and I really 
do not like the phrase “rule of law,” but I think you know what I mean:  the 
instruments of democracy, due process, freedom of the press, the right to 
dissent, all of those things which I prefer much more than the “rule of law” 
because, let’s be frank, the “rule of law” was what brought us segregation, 
apartheid, and genocidal regimes. 
In any event, I gave that commencement address in the United States 
having just come from an environment where people were preoccupied with 
populism.  It is a global problem.  By populism, what I had in my head was 
the majoritarian impulse to be exclusionary.  It frightened me because I was 
born in Germany after the Second World War.  My parents had been in 
concentration camps.  I do not know how they survived, but they did, and my 
grandmother as well.  I was born in 1946, during the Nuremberg Trials.  We 
came to Canada in 1950.  The trials were by then over.  The shadow of my 
childhood was all about what had happened in Nazi Germany. 
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It was not, for some reason that I cannot explain, a depressing shadow for 
me.  My parents were very happy, optimistic people; they never complained.  
My father had been a lawyer in Europe, a graduate of the Jagiellonian 
University in Kraków, came to Canada and went to the Law Society and 
asked, “What tests do I have to take to be a lawyer?” because the Americans 
had hired him in Germany to represent displaced persons. 
And the Law Society said:  “In Ontario you cannot be a lawyer.  You have 
to be a citizen, and that will take you five years.” 
My father had my younger sister and me, my mother, and my grandmother 
to support, so he became an insurance agent.  He never complained. 
I made up my mind at that moment—it is one of my earliest memories—
that I was going to be a lawyer.  I was four, and I had no idea what it meant, 
but I was going to be what my father could not be. 
That is the origin of how I was introduced to what I think is “justice” and 
“injustice.”  It ends up in my Brandeis speech this way:  To go back to 
Germany, having left as a displaced person who lived in Stuttgart in the 
displaced-persons camp, and then go back in 2017 as a judge of Canada’s 
Supreme Court and meet with the judges of the German Constitutional Court, 
was fantastic.  As you know from Ingo Müller’s book Hitler’s Justice,4 
judges in Nazi Germany were the people from whom I learned not to use the 
words “rule of law.”’  They were so technical in their approach, and they 
were aggressive in implementing all of the anti-Semitic laws.5 
So, I was terrified at what was happening in the rest of the world.  Canada 
is in wonderful shape.  The United States is strong and resilient.  But we 
made a global bargain after World War II.  We had Nuremberg, we had the 
Genocide Convention, we had the Declaration of Human Rights, and the 
bargain was human rights primacy:  we do not murder people; we do not 
allow states to take their rights away. 
And yet, here we are.  It is happening again.  There is no human rights 
enforcement; forty million people have died since the United Nations was set 
up.  Imagine, forty million people in global conflicts. 
But look at how respectful the global community has been about trade.  We 
have the World Trade Organization, set up by the Marrakesh Agreement in 
1994.6  There is an enforcement mechanism; countries comply with their 
trade obligations.  But not with their human rights obligations. 
So I am nervous because I have grandchildren, and I am nervous for the 
world because people who say “we must get our rights back” are polarized 
and said to be left-wing.  Imagine human rights being left-wing.  And there 
is a sense of governments keeping hands off again, instead of intervening to 
help with human rights, and there is nothing that I see internationally that 
                                                 
 4. See generally INGO MÜLLER, HITLER’S JUSTICE:  THE COURTS OF THE THIRD REICH 
(Deborah Lucas Schneider trans., 1992). 
 5. See generally id. 
 6. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization art. I, Apr. 15, 
1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 3. 
2018] CONVERSATION WITH ROSALIE SILBERMAN ABELLA 847 
makes me feel that the moral consensus that put together the United Nations 
and those 1948 conventions is there anymore. 
Because there is nothing to stop it—I am not talking about “boots on the 
ground”; I really understand that that is not just one country’s responsibility.  
I am talking about a moral sense, a moral coalition, and I just do not see it 
developing. 
So, I came back from Germany to Brandeis feeling very moved about 
being back in Germany as a judge, but also worrying about what was 
happening everywhere in Europe except in Germany.  How ironic is that? 
The Brandeis speech was a cry from the heart ending with, as you will 
remember, a thank you to the United States because it was the United 
States—the army, the Allies in Stuttgart, where we lived, and where my 
father practiced law for the Americans—that restored his confidence in the 
possibility of justice.  So I always saw Americans as the beacons.  They were 
the people who taught us about justice; they were the people who made our 
lives possible, let alone our sense of justice.  So I am grateful but also wistful, 
and I am worried. 
DEAN DILLER:  How do you think about your role as a justice in 
speaking to issues like this? 
JUSTICE ABELLA:  One of the great advantages of being older is that 
you have lived through trends.  When I graduated from law school in 1970, 
I was a Canadian law student who was so jealous of the American Supreme 
Court.  I thought the muscular application of your Constitution in the Warren 
Court was just tremendous. 
Canada at the time had a Constitution, which was about the division of 
powers.  So what did we learn from our 700-page casebook?  Who was in 
charge of egg marketing boards—the federal government or the provincial 
government? 
I saw what you were doing and the rights that were being protected here—
speech, the rights of the accused—in so many areas, and it made me so proud 
of your judges. 
Then it started to happen in Canada when we got our constitutionalized set 
of rights in 1982, and what was wonderful was that the press was with us and 
loved the newly strong, rights-focused Supreme Court.  Here’s another thing, 
when we struck laws down, like abortion or gay marriage, the waters closed.  
We do not revisit them.  It seems that the issues here in the United States, on 
the other hand, stay alive forever. 
In the 1980s, Canada had a very popular Supreme Court.  And then in the 
1990s we started to get some of the rhetorical impact of what was happening 
here in the United States.  People started to talk about judicial activism; about 
the politicization of the Canadian judiciary; about how judges should only 
interpret law, not make it. 
So I started to think hard:  “What is my role as a judge?”  And when I 
figured out that those were labels that were meant to presumptively dismiss 
results that people did not agree with, I realized that my role was to make 
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law, that that is what judges do.  Even when you are interpreting law, you are 
making law. 
I will give you a classic example:  The Canadian Constitution said that 
only “Persons” could be appointed to the Senate.7  Five women wanted to go 
to the Senate.  The Supreme Court of Canada in 1928 said that “Persons” 
does not include women,8 an originalist interpretation of the Constitution. 
It went to the Privy Council in England, which was our appeal route in 
those days until 1949, and Lord Sankey, who was the Chief Justice, said:  “Of 
course ‘Persons’ includes women.”  Constitutions are—and this is our 
guiding constitutional principle—“living trees” that grow with the times.  
You have to give what Lord Sankey called “a large and liberal 
interpretation,” not a technical one.9 
So judges in Canada think they have a responsibility to approach law, 
constitutional law in particular, in a way that tries at least to keep pace and 
occasionally lead.  Courts are not majoritarian institutions, they are not there 
to cater to the majority.  That is what legislatures do; they are responsive to 
the public, and if they do not do what the public wants, they can lose their 
jobs at the polls. 
Judges in my country have until they are seventy-five.  We are independent 
and have tenure until then so that we can be impartial, risk being unpopular, 
and be able to do things that protect minorities.  Judges are not in a popularity 
contest.  We do what we think is the right thing, and time will tell whether it 
was right.  If it turns out not to be, we have changed it, as we did with the 
law of assisted dying.  Twenty-five years ago our Court said, “There’s 
nothing wrong with a criminal prohibition.”  Two years ago, we said there 
was. 
We did the same thing with the prostitution laws.  Twenty-five years ago 
the Court said, “There is nothing wrong with criminalizing it.”  Two years 
ago, we said, “There is a problem if it means prostitution is unsafe.” 
It is not that we are indifferent to public opinion, we just don’t know who 
the “public” is.  So we are not accountable to public opinion because I don’t 
even know what that means.  Is it what the Washington Post says?  Is it what 
the Wall Street Journal says?  Is it what social media says? 
We are not unaware of what our reading tells us is happening, but we’re 
responsible to the public interest.  And I think that gives us a responsibility 
to try to make the right decision notwithstanding what we think the public, 
the majority of the public—whatever that means—wants us to do. 
DEAN DILLER:  That is a fantastic statement of the judicial role in 
adjudicating cases.  What about in speaking to issues outside of the context 
of a case?  I ask because I know how forthright you are in Canada about your 
                                                 
 7. See Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c 3, para. 24 (U.K.). 
 8. See Reference re Meaning of the Word “Persons” in Section 24 of the British North 
America Act, 1867, [1928] S.C.R. 276, 276 (Can.). 
 9. See Edwards v. Canada (Att’y Gen), [1930] AC 124 (PC) 136 (appeal taken from Sup. 
Ct. of Can.). 
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deeply felt views and your commitment to justice.  How do you think about, 
like this forum, speaking out on issues outside the context of deciding a case? 
JUSTICE ABELLA:  I think that is a fair question.  I think once you 
become a judge there is a Faustian bargain.  I have lost certain rights of 
speech, but I made the bargain willingly because the only opinions that matter 
most are those that will show up in a judgment.  I know I will be criticized if 
people don’t like those opinions, but that’s their right. 
But there are a lot of things I cannot talk about, will not talk about.  But I 
feel perfectly free, and believe strongly, that judges should be explaining to 
the public what they do and why they do it.  We are not hermetically sealed, 
and we belong to the public.  But that doesn’t mean we’re not also private 
people. 
I will speak at universities.  There are some groups I will not speak to just 
because they have expressly political—small “p” or large “P”—agendas.  But 
after forty-two years, I have to say I cannot complain that I have not had a 
chance to say what I think on matters related to being a judge. 
We in Canada, at least, have the conversation about should we, shouldn’t 
we, is this the right forum, is that the right forum?  I have to say there is a 
part of me that just looks at the freedom of expression your judges seem to 
have, the books they write, the lectures they give, the articles they write, the 
things they speak about—and part of me goes:  “Wow!  That is really gutsy.” 
We are Canadian.  We are not un-gutsy, but we are not as “out there.” 
DEAN DILLER:  You have written a few books and articles yourself. 
JUSTICE ABELLA:  I have.  But the context is different; the culture is 
different; the expectations are different. 
You had judges speaking out.  It has always been a very different tradition.  
We are “kinder and gentler” and more cautious, I think.  But we are moving 
toward being more “out there.” 
DEAN DILLER:  I want to come back to something that you touched on 
in your comment about your Brandeis speech, which was that what brought 
you to it were meetings you had just had with the German Constitutional 
Court and the Italian Constitutional Court.  The frame for the speech is really 
a moral consensus among democracies.  How important is it for judiciaries 
to be in contact with each other, and how do you affect each other? 
JUSTICE ABELLA:  I think it is crucial for us to be in touch with one 
another, and I think a lot of your judges feel the same way.  We have 
exchanges with the American Supreme Court every three years.  We either 
go to Washington or they come to Ottawa. 
I have to tell you, when the American Supreme Court comes to Ottawa, 
and I am walking down the street, people will say, “Who’s that with Sandra 
Day O’Connor?”  Canadians know all of your justices.  I don’t think they 
could name the nine judges on the Canadian Supreme Court. 
We also have exchanges with the Israeli Supreme Court, the U.K., the 
Indian Supreme Court, the European Court of Human Rights, France, South 
Africa, Australia, among others.  And it is because those of us with 
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constitutions all have post–World War II constitutions.  The post–World War 
II constitutions see the world differently. 
For a start, we all have a balancing provision.  It is the very first provision 
in the Canadian Constitution:  all rights are guaranteed subject only to those 
reasonable limits justified in a free and democratic society.10  What that 
means is, if there is a breach of the Constitution, the onus shifts to the 
government to justify it by looking at what other democracies are doing. 
There you have the very first section of our Constitution not only giving 
us a balancing as opposed to the absolutist approach seemingly mandated by 
your older Constitution, we are also directed to look at international and 
comparative law.  We do not have the debate about whether we should be 
looking at what other countries do.  It is constitutionally required. 
And we find it really helpful because many constitutional issues arise all 
over the world.  There are universal concerns with local contexts.  The 
constitutional democracies look at what each is doing in the rights area. 
But it has led to, I think, even though there are certainly conversations with 
American judges, the rest of us having conversations—what Cynthia Ozick 
called the “exegetical voices calling to one another”11—and watching each 
other’s jurisprudence, whether we like what they do or whether we don’t.  
You can get some very good ideas even from people you disagree with.  It is 
Isaiah Berlin who said that there is no pearl without some irritation in the 
oyster.12  It makes you think, what don’t I like about that? 
But what has happened among the post–World War II constitutional courts 
is that we have similar approaches to equality and to speech—to hate speech, 
for example—while the United States, because it has a different 
constitutional history, approaches its Constitution differently from the rest of 
us.  I do not want to say “outlier” because it has its own traditions, and they 
are venerable and respectable traditions, but they are very different from what 
every other liberal democracy in the world is doing in key areas. 
DEAN DILLER:  Earlier you said that the Warren Court was a huge 
influence on you and shaped your conception of what judges can do and 
courts can do.  Does the U.S. Supreme Court still have that kind of influence 
globally? 
JUSTICE ABELLA:  Not in the rights area, I would say, and it is because 
the constitutional histories are very different.  I will give you an example of 
Canada’s approach to originalism.  In 1985, three years after the Charter was 
                                                 
 10. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.) (“The Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable 
limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”). 
 11. CYNTHIA OZICK, HEIR TO THE GLIMMERING WORLD 73 (First Mariner Books ed. 2005). 
 12. Cf. Letter from Isaiah Berlin to John Grigg (May 26, 1981), in ISAIAH BERLIN, 
AFFIRMING:  LETTERS 1975–1997 (Henry Hardy & Mark Pottle eds., 2015) (“Supposing an 
oyster says that it is not interested in pearls, doesn’t want to enrich culture, just wants to live 
an ordinary, normal oyster’s life in the kind of conditions in which other creatures live theirs—
if need be, remain ungifted, ordinary and obscure—is that forbidden?”). 
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enacted, we had a case called the Reference re BC Motor Vehicle Act,13 and 
the question was, what does Section 7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
mean?  Section 7 says that everyone is entitled to life, liberty, and security of 
the person.14 
We had evidence from the government that what it intended was that this 
be a procedural provision.  The Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, 
said:  We think it should be procedural and substantive.15  That was last time 
anybody ever made an originalist argument. [Laughter] 
On the other hand, in division-of-powers cases, we do look at history.  I 
know from your 1934 Snyder16 case that history matters.  But we do not use 
it as an anchor.  We understand that it is important to be aware of where you 
have been and why, but we take that as a starting point rather than the end of 
the conversation. 
The main reason I think there are differences between the United States 
and Canada and other liberal democracies is self-evident:  we are all affected 
by our political origins. 
Canada was a bargain between two groups at the constitutional table:  the 
French and the English.  Their bargain was:  “We are two different cultures, 
but we are coming together as equals.”  So in our DNA is the right to be 
different.  That means that when we got our Charter, our rights protection, in 
1982 we already had rights that were group rights, along with the individual 
rights you have.  This is why we excel at multiculturalism. 
In the United States, on the other hand, the political origins were Hobbes, 
Locke, Hume, Mill, with an emphasis on the right of the individual.  Because 
you had come from the bizarre brow of George III, every individual was to 
be equal, and that meant every individual was to be treated the same.  
Whether you were the king or the person who cleaned the king’s palace, you 
had the same rights.  That is what “civil liberties” meant:  the same right to 
be treated the same by the state.  Those are the origins of libertarianism and 
the political origins of this country. 
It made it very difficult to think in terms of groups.  I think affirmative 
action is a tricky concept here because it is a group remedy, and the 
constitutional DNA here does not seem to feel comfortable with group rights. 
Assimilation is your model:  treat everybody the same.  Our model is:  you 
cannot be equal unless you acknowledge how different people are.  If you are 
in a wheelchair, you cannot be treated as somebody who is able-bodied; you 
need a ramp to get in.  If you are pregnant, if you are nonwhite, if you are 
indigenous—you are entitled to have your differences respected.  So we have 
integration, and you have assimilation. 
You have a “melting pot” theory, and we have a “melting pot if necessary 
but not necessarily a melting pot” theory.  I think this binary nature of rights, 
                                                 
 13. Reference re BC Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486 (Can.). 
 14. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms § 7, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, 
being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.). 
 15. See generally Reference re BC Motor Vehicle Act, 2 S.C.R. 486 (Can.). 
 16. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934). 
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which drives Canada’s constitutional interpretation, is a huge difference.  
And it explains the differences in our approaches to both speech and equality. 
DEAN DILLER:  I will ask about speech in a moment.  Your comments 
made me think about employment equity, which is a very different concept 
in Canadian law than antidiscrimination law, and I think it draws on some of 
the distinctions you are talking about.  What is the concept of employment 
equity? 
JUSTICE ABELLA:  Employment equity is something that I made up.  
[Laughter] 
This is something that judges will rarely admit to doing, but this was a 
Royal Commission.  You do not have Royal Commissions here. 
DEAN DILLER:  Without the word “royal,” we have commissions. 
JUSTICE ABELLA:  This was a one-person Royal Commission that the 
government of Canada asked me to do when I was thirty-seven years old, to 
look at how to deal with the barriers in employment for women, aboriginal 
people, nonwhites—they called them “visible minorities”—and persons with 
disabilities. 
I suspected at the time that it was not necessarily something that was going 
to be taken all that seriously because I was a one-person, provincially 
appointed judge doing a federal Royal Commission for $1 million, and I had 
one year to do it.  And what was floating around the country at the same time 
was a seven-person, four-year, several-million-dollar Royal Commission on 
Baby Seals.17  I said to myself, “Okay, do your best, but it’s not going to go 
anywhere.” 
The main question for my Royal Commission was:  Should Canada have 
affirmative action?  I met for two hours in seventeen cities over the course of 
six weeks with each of the four groups, plus representatives of business and 
labor.  That meant six meetings in each city with only one break in the 
seventeen weeks. 
What was amazing to me was that in those two-hour meetings—this is how 
the pearl comes from irritation—the first hour of every meeting with each 
one of the six groups was a debate about what “affirmative action” meant.  
The person who was the head of the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) dealing with affirmative action at the time was 
Clarence Thomas. 
They either said affirmative action means quotas, or no quotas, and I 
thought, “Really?  Do I want to adopt a phrase nobody understands?”  And I 
am not a quota fan because quotas were used to keep Jews out of universities, 
so I never really saw them as something that allows people in.  I also thought 
that quotas start off being the floor, and they often end up being the ceiling. 
I listened to all of these people tell me what they thought affirmative action 
meant.  No consensus.  And I thought, “Why not come up with something 
                                                 
 17. See generally ROYAL COMM’N ON SEALS & THE SEALING INDUS. IN CAN., SEALS AND 
SEALING IN CANADA:  REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION (1986), http://publications.gc.ca/ 
site/eng/472269/publication.html [https://perma.cc/D87J-HZEL]. 
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new that is distinctly Canadian?”  I thought, “It is about fairness, equity — 
that is a term lawyers use—in employment.”  So it became “employment 
equity.” 
But the most important part of that report—it was a 300-page report, all 
written by hand except for the part about statistics, which I do not understand, 
so I actually say in the report, “This part on statistics was written by a 
statistician named Jenny Podoluk.”18 
The first eighteen pages were my intellectual struggle with “What does 
equality mean?”19  It was a Royal Commission on Equality in Employment.  
The only example I had was the Fourteenth Amendment.20  And I did not 
like the Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence because it was Diceyan and 
Aristotelian:  you treat likes alike.  As Anatole France said, the rich and the 
poor have the same right to sleep under bridges and steal bread.21  But 
“sameness” was not what I was hearing.  I heard people being excluded 
because they were different, which is the heart of discrimination. 
Then I found Griggs v. Duke Power Co.22 and the Title VII jurisprudence 
from the American Supreme Court.  When I read this 1971 decision about 
the built-in headwinds that exclude people based on race, I thought:  “Perfect.  
That’s exactly the model that I think equality needs.  It’s an 
antidiscrimination tool.”  So in those first eighteen pages I said that equality 
means accommodating and acknowledging people’s differences so they 
could be treated as equals.23 
The Report of the Royal Commission was implemented in Canada within 
four months, then in Northern Ireland24 and New Zealand25—which had a 
government that ran on the promise that if they were elected, they would get 
rid of employment equity.  They were and they did.  I didn’t put it on my 
curriculum vitae, “repealed before she was forty.” 
But what was really moving to me was that the very first case the Supreme 
Court of Canada heard about what our new equality provision meant—the 
report came out in 1984—was a case in 1989 called Andrews.26  The question 
was whether a lawyer from England could practice law or whether the 
citizenship requirement in the Law Society Act violated the equality 
guarantee in the Constitution. 
                                                 
 18. See ROSALIE SILBERMAN ABELLA, EQUALITY IN EMPLOYMENT:  A ROYAL COMMISSION 
REPORT 52 (1984). 
 19. Id. at 1–18. 
 20. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 21. ANATOLE FRANCE, THE RED LILY 87 (Maison Mazarin Paris ed. 1905) (“The poor 
must work for this, in presence of the majestic quality of the law which prohibits the wealthy 
as well as the poor from sleeping under the bridges, from begging in the streets, and from 
stealing bread.”). 
 22. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
 23. See ABELLA, supra note 18, at 3 (“Sometimes equality means treating people the same, 
despite their differences, and sometimes it means treating them as equals by accommodating 
their differences.”). 
 24. See Fair Employment (Northern Ireland) Act 1989 c. 32. 
 25. See Employment Equity Act 1990 (N.Z.). 
 26. See Andrews v. Law Soc’y of B.C., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 (Can.). 
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DEAN DILLER:  It had a certain family resonance with you, I take it. 
JUSTICE ABELLA:  The Supreme Court of Canada used my words and 
my definition of equality to strike down what had kept my father out of the 
practice of law.  He died when I was in my third year of law school, so he 
never saw any of this. 
Life is quite amazing, isn’t it?  If somebody had said:  “Do this Royal 
Commission.  One day it will be part of your family history and be something 
that your father would have valued and appreciated.” 
But the chances of that happening were so remote.  It feels wondrous to 
me to be able to say that you are the person who created what equality means 
in Canada, someone who came from where I came from, from what had 
happened to my family. 
I united the country when my Royal Commission came out.  I really did:  
every newspaper in Canada said, “This is awful.”  It is very hard to get 
consensus on a public policy issue, but in 1984 on November 21st when the 
report came out, every single newspaper said:  “What?  You’re going to force 
people to hire more women?  What about the merit system?  What about 
reverse discrimination?” 
I just thought, “Mm-hmm, they really don’t like it.” 
Then the government, a different government from the one that had 
appointed me to do the Royal Commission—a Conservative government—
adopted it.27  So you never know.  You just got to do what you got to do. 
DEAN DILLER:  That is an amazing story. 
JUSTICE ABELLA:  Incredible, isn’t it? 
DEAN DILLER:  Thank you for sharing it. 
While we are talking about employment equality, you were appointed to 
the bench when you were twenty-nine years old.  What particular challenges 
did you face as a young woman as a lawyer and as a judge? 
JUSTICE ABELLA:  I think in a way it was a lot easier for me than it was 
for women who are lawyers now or even ten years after me.  When I went to 
law school there were five women out of one hundred and fifty law students.  
When I was called to the bar—you had to article for a year—there were about 
fifteen women out of over five hundred lawyers. 
So we were anomalous.  We did not threaten anybody.  I never saw another 
woman in a courtroom.  When I had our first child in 1973, I did not know 
any lawyers who were mothers.  So I didn’t have anybody who said to me, 
“You shouldn’t be wearing hot pants in court.”  I didn’t know that because 
there were no other women in the courtroom.  And I can tell you that 
pregnancy was a very good advocacy technique, because I never lost a case 
when I was pregnant. [Laughter] 
So I did not have the role model problem.  I did not have lean in, lean out, 
lean up, lean down,28 anything like it.  And there was no such thing as how 
                                                 
 27. See Employment Equity Act, S.C. 1995, c 44 (Can.). 
 28. See, e.g., SHERYL SANDBERG, LEAN IN:  WOMEN, WORK, AND THE WILL TO LEAD 
(2013). 
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to do work-life balance because there was no work-life balance.  In fact, there 
is no work-life balance. 
I did it in a way that worked for us, for my husband and me, not because 
this is what “one” does.  I came home every day at 6:00 to be with the kids, 
and I went back downtown every night at 8:00 when they were in bed and 
then 9:00 and then 10:00, and then I realized, “You know, they could 
probably get to bed without me,” because 10:00 is very late to go downtown, 
and coming home at 3:00 a.m. is very late to come back. 
When I would come back downtown to go to work, that is when I saw male 
lawyers going home.  But I needed to see my children.  It was really important 
for me to get that battery charge of seeing them.  I knew they were fine; my 
husband was home with them because he was a professor and he made the 
time to be with them because he wanted to. 
It was very lucky for me, but because I was so anomalous as a judge and a 
mother and a lawyer I got a lot of calls from the press saying, “We want to 
do a ‘how do you manage?’ story.” 
And I said, not until I’m seventy-five.  I have a really supportive husband.  
My mother lives five minutes away.  My kids are healthy.  My husband’s 
whole salary goes towards paying for a nanny.  Why are you asking me how 
I manage?  Why don’t you ask the women who get up at 4:00 a.m., drag their 
kids to daycare, come home from underpaid jobs, do the housework when 
they get home, and then do it again the next day.  And they have terrific kids.  
That’s who you should be doing articles about.  If, when I am seventy-five 
and my husband still likes me and my kids are nice people, then maybe. 
It was so clear to me that they were so surprised by women with 
credentials, but they did not realize that we have had working women for a 
long time under really tough circumstances.  They never had magazine 
articles on work-life balance because there wasn’t any. 
I took a job as a family court judge because they asked me.  That is the 
story of my career.  So I am saying to all of you law students:  I never once 
dreamed of being a judge, let alone on the Supreme Court.  I went to law 
school because I really wanted to be a lawyer, and I wanted to be a really 
good lawyer.  But I never had any thoughts of anything beyond that. 
When you are an immigrant, you never think in terms of entitlement.  You 
think in terms of opportunities and working really hard.  So my career is like 
Sammy Cahn, the songwriter.  Somebody once said to him, “What came first, 
the words or the music?”  He said, “The phone call.” 
So that is my career.  “You want to be a family court judge?” 
“Sure, that sounds great.” 
And people said:  “Don’t be a family court judge.  Are you kidding?  You 
could one day be on the Supreme Court of Ontario, a real trial court.  The 
family court is nothing.  It’s the bottom of the judicial hierarchy!” 
I said:  “I don’t even know any judges, and they want me to be one.  I’m 
not going to say no.”  And I did that all the way through my career. 
But what was hard—and I had not anticipated—was that as a family court 
judge I was deciding every day for seven years whether to take other people’s 
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babies away, when I had two of my own.  I was pregnant with one child, and 
I had a three-year-old at home.  I do not think in all my years as a judge, as a 
labor board chair, Royal Commissioner, nothing was ever harder than 
deciding whether to take other people’s kids away because I knew what it 
felt like to have a child.  Even if you say you’re only removing the child for 
three weeks, that is a long time for a child. 
But here is the irony.  I learned how to be a judge from the family court, 
because the tendency always in law is to be top-down.  I learned to see law 
from the experiences of the people who were before me, not top-down, not 
looking at people who do not have childcare and do not have healthy kids 
and do not have husbands who are ready to do everything they can to help.  
Looking at it from their eyes.  Looking at the law and justice from their eyes 
taught me how to be a judge through all the rest of my judicial career. 
This is my message to all of you law students:  take chances.  Here I am 
on the Supreme Court of Canada, having done everything that came along 
because they asked me to.  And if you had said to me, “If you want to be on 
the Supreme Court of Canada, don’t you dare do the family court, because 
they never elevate judges from that court.  You do not go from being on the 
lowest court in the country to being on the highest.” 
They also said:  “You don’t want to be a Royal Commissioner on 
affirmative action.  It’s too controversial.”  And, “You don’t want to do a 
labor board because that is nothing but strikes and problems all the time.”  
Law Reform Commission?  “Terrible.  Always changing the law.” 
So it was not until I got to the Ontario Court of Appeal that they said:  “Oh, 
good.  A real job in the legal profession.” [Laughter] 
But, I wrote the first gay rights judgments on the Court of Appeal.29  That 
is a deal breaker.  Striking down the anti-sodomy provisions for fourteen- to 
eighteen-year-olds in the criminal code?  If I had in my head, “Will this help 
me or hurt me get to the Supreme Court?” I do not know what I would have 
done.  Ambition can be a sedative, if there is something you really want.  But 
there was nothing I really wanted.  I felt so lucky that I was on the Court of 
Appeal. 
Doing the right thing can sometimes take you places you never dreamed 
possible. 
DEAN DILLER:  That is fantastic advice.  I have a few more questions. 
JUSTICE ABELLA:  When people want to give you advice, do what you 
want to do, because advice comes from above, and everybody is different. 
Dean Diller, did you take people’s advice?  Didn’t you just do what you 
thought was the right thing to do? 
DEAN DILLER:  I find it helpful to hear advice because I think when you 
react when you hear advice, it helps clarify how you think about it because 
you react to the advice.  I am a gatherer, I believe in gathering advice.  That 
does not mean you follow the advice. 
JUSTICE ABELLA:  Good distinction. 
                                                 
 29. See R. v. Carmen M., [1995] 23 O.R. 3d 629 (Can. Ont. C.A.). 
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DEAN DILLER:  In the end, you have to do what is comfortable to you 
and what your gut tells you to do.  But getting to that point, I find I am helped 
by advice. 
JUSTICE ABELLA:  You’re right. 
DEAN DILLER:  There is no—and everyone is different.  Everyone is 
different. 
JUSTICE ABELLA:  That is very good advice. [Laughter] 
DEAN DILLER:  Given your long work on employment equality, how do 
you look at the Me Too movement now and issues of sexual harassment that 
are now drawing such public attention, and is that going on in Canada as 
well? 
JUSTICE ABELLA:  Every generation rediscovers the women’s 
movement.  It is part of our history in North America.  Every generation of 
the women’s movement has talked about pay equity, childcare, sexual 
harassment, and domestic violence. 
It was all over the consciousness of Canada in the 1970s and here in the 
United States and in the 1980s and in the 1990s, and it just stayed there.  It 
was a tenacious reality for dependent women in workplaces.  So everybody 
knew it because there were cases that occasionally made their way through 
the courts, but we all knew that most cases did not. 
What is intriguing to me, because it was not just Me Too, was the fact that 
it did not really ignite as a movement until it hit Hollywood.  It was 
fascinating for me to see that.  What did it, I think, was that the victims were 
famous.  They were people the public related to.  And I am struck by how it 
has taken off.  It is a social conflagration. 
I think it is largely to be expected because it has been under wraps for a 
long time, and the grievances have been private.  I think we all have to be 
careful about disclosures and make sure you have got all the information. 
But the fact of this now giving women a chance to publicly air the fact that 
they have felt inappropriately exploited for a long time is, I think, something 
that was coming for a long time. 
I do not know what is going to happen down the road, whether it will affect 
the other areas in need of attention, like domestic violence, pay equity, or 
other forms of harassment.  But as a spectator it was amazing to watch. 
DEAN DILLER:  I have one more question for you. 
I started by asking you about your Brandeis speech and your concern for 
the state of democracy in the world, so I want to end on something that is a 
little different, and this is a good segue, which is:  What is going on that gives 
you real hope and excitement and holds real promise? 
JUSTICE ABELLA:  Other than my granddaughter and grandson?  The 
fact that there are people who are really concerned about what is going on.  I 
do not feel that I am out there alone speaking up about what is going on in 
Europe or in Canada.  I think millions of people are concerned about the 
social polarization, about the global fragmentation, people who are younger, 
people with more expertise than I have, people who can speak out.  That gives 
me hope. 
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People are on it.  Democracy is complicated, and I think it works best when 
there are checks and balances; when you have a very strong and independent 
judiciary and you have a very strong and independent press. 
When those things are not there, as they are not in some places in the 
world, it is problematic, if not tragic.  But at least people talk about it, and 
they worry about what to do about it. 
I will tell you this:  I think some of the international organizations we have 
set up and held up to fix these problems are organizations we need to rethink.  
I am just not sure that we aren’t where we were with the League of Nations.  
I think the U.N. agencies do amazing work, but I think as a deliberative body 
setting the norms, if you look at what the United Nations was set up to do—
setting the world’s norms—I think a lot could be said for the fact that even 
though it is all we have, it is surely not the best we can do. 
Young people are hope.  That is the future, young lawyers in a law school 
like this one who have great professors telling them what justice means.  
They can form their own conclusions, but they will get bedrock ideas.  
Whatever you do—corporate world, legal services, teaching, novelist, it 
doesn’t matter—you will understand what justice means from this school.  
So you are the hope.  So thank you for teaching them. 
DEAN DILLER:  By the way, I completely agree with that. 
Justice Abella, thank you so much.  Let me say on many topics we have 
barely scratched the surface, or really not scratched the surface, but at the 
same time I think you have conveyed a powerful image of justice and the role 
of the courts and the meaning of democracy, and I thank you for that.  It is 
great to have you here at our school. 
JUSTICE ABELLA:  Thank you.  It is a pleasure to be here.  Thank you 
all for coming. 
 
